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INTRODUCTION
The breadth of activities and organizational forms among religious organizations rivals
that of nonprofits generally, and religious organizations are vulnerable to the same types of
problems that justify state regulation and oversight of nonprofits. Such problems include
excessive compensation, improper benefits for board members and other insiders, misleading or
fraudulent fundraising, employment discrimination, unsafe working conditions, consumer fraud,
improper debt collection, and many others.1 Religious organizations are different, however, in
that under federal and state law they enjoy unique protections from state regulation.
This paper describes how such federal and state protections limit state regulation of
religious organizations under current case law. It also explores the tension between the general
ability of states to apply neutral and generally applicable laws to religiously motivated conduct
and the special legal protections provided for some internal actions of religious organizations—
particularly employment actions relating to ministers and certain internal disputes. It concludes
by exploring how courts are likely to develop such limits in the future.
I.

CURRENT LIMITS ON STATE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Three related sets of limitations apply to interactions between governments and both
religious organizations and religiously motivated activities. First, the federal Constitution
usually permits the application of generally applicable, neutral laws to such organizations and
activities as long as that application is done in a non-discriminatory manner. This permission is
*
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Garnett, and William Marshall for helpful comments, to Joseph Ganahl for research assistance, and to the Columbia
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1
See, e.g., Memorandum from Theresa Pattara & Sean Barnett to Senator Charles Grassley (Jan. 6, 2011), available
at http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=5fa343ed-87eb-49b0-82b9-28a9502910f7
(collecting allegations of such misconduct by religious organizations).
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tempered, however, by the fact that the federal government and some states have chosen to
provide protection for religious organizations and individuals beyond that required by the federal
Constitution through religious freedom statutes, state constitutional provisions, and the federal
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Second, the federal Constitution protects
certain internal decisions by religious organizations from the reach of even generally applicable,
neutral laws and may, by extension, prohibit other government involvement in such decisions.
Third and finally, the federal Constitution and related case law limits the ability of private parties
to challenge decisions by the government to exempt religious organizations from otherwise
applicable laws or otherwise treat them favorably even if not required to do so by the federal
Constitution, although such challenges are still possible under some circumstances. This Part
explores these existing limitations as they impact state regulation of religious organizations.
A. Free Exercise & the Smith Decision
The most commonly cited source of protection from government regulation for religious
organizations is the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides in relevant part:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”2 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, these limitations apply to the state
governments as well as to the federal government.3 In the few Free Exercise Clause cases it
considered before the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted the latter part of this
provision as only prohibiting the government from interfering with religious belief, but not from
interfering with religiously motivated actions.4 The Court did not clearly extend the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause to religiously motivated actions until the 1960s,5 although it
suggested that such protection existed in 1940.6 Even then the protection was less than it
appeared. While on its face the Court imposed strict scrutiny—requiring any law that placed a
substantial burden on religiously motivated actions to be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling governmental interest—in practice the Court often watered down that protection
while continuing to use strict scrutiny language.7 This watering down was particularly evident
with respect to Free Exercise Clause challenges to federal tax laws, including restrictions on taxexempt religious organizations.8

2

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause as against the states);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the Free Exercise Clause as against the states).
4
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“Congress was deprived [by the First Amendment] of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.”); see also Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free
Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 125 (2002); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 938 (1989).
5
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
6
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
7
See Alan Hurst, Hosanna-Tabor and the Exaggerated Decline of Separationism 14-15 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230022; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax
Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1157–58 & n.103 (2009);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1127 (1990).
8
See Mayer, supra note 7, at 1158–59 (discussing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying request for
exemption from social security tax)); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (involving tax
exemption); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (involving the charitable contribution deduction).
3
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More importantly, the extension of protection to religiously motivated actions was only
temporary, as the Court set it aside in the 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith.9 In
Smith, the Supreme Court concluded that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”10
While the law at issue in Smith was a criminal law prohibiting the use of peyote, the Court did
not explicitly limit its holding to illegal drug laws specifically or criminal laws more generally.11
The case has therefore generally been interpreted as allowing the federal government and state
governments to apply any valid and neutral laws of general applicability to religious
organizations and individuals in the same manner as they apply those laws to non-religious
organizations and individuals, even if such application prevents or substantially burdens
religiously motivated actions.12 For example, the California Supreme Court applied Smith to
conclude that a state law mandating that employers provide health insurance coverage for
contraception did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the law was a neutral and
generally applicable one.13
Smith does not, of course, protect either laws that are intentionally targeted at disfavored
religiously motivated actions or selective enforcement of otherwise neutral and generally
applicable laws against disfavored religious organizations or individuals. For example, only
three years after the Smith decision, the Supreme Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah14 struck down three ordinances that it found a local government had enacted to
suppress the central worship service element of a disfavored religion.15 It concluded that these
ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable, and so could only survive constitutional
scrutiny if they were narrowly tailored to further one or more compelling government interests,
which the Court found they were not.16 Similarly, federal courts have concluded that a
constitutional claim of selective or discriminatory prosecution in violation of the Fifth
Amendment may be based on a demonstration of religious animus, a claim that is most often
raised in the criminal prosecution context.17 A religious organization could therefore
successfully challenge the selective application of an otherwise neutral and generally applicable
law if it can meet the relatively high evidentiary burden of proving that the selective application
was based on discrimination against that organization’s particular religious beliefs. For example,
9

494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a more in-depth discussion of the Court’s path to Smith and the ramifications of that
decision, see the paper prepared by Mark E. Chopko (Some Thoughts about Regulating Religious Charity) for this
collection.
10
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
11
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
12
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997) (discussing Smith in the context of case involving a
zoning ordinance without any indication that Smith would not apply); Fairbanks v. Brackettville Bd. of Educ., 2000
WL 821401, at *2 (5th Cir. May 30, 2000) (concluding that the holding in Smith is not limited to criminal laws and
gathering cases to this effect).
13
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 82 (Cal. 2004); see also Catholic Charities
of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 522 (2006) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to a similar
law).
14
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
15
See id. at 534.
16
See id. at 542 (not neutral), 545–46 (not generally applicable), 546–47 (not narrowly tailored and not furthering
compelling governmental interests).
17
See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 730 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. O’Driscoll, 203 F. Supp.
2d 334, 342 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
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a federal district court recently considered a claim by officials of a tax-exempt religious
organization that the indictment against them relating to the alleged activities of their
organization must be dismissed because of religiously based selective prosecution in violation of
the Fifth Amendment, although the court ultimately rejected this claim because the officials
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecution had both discriminatory
effect and discriminatory purpose.18
The Court in Smith also acknowledged two exceptions to the rule it adopted in that case.
The first exception was for “hybrid” claims that implicated one or more constitutional provisions
other than the Free Exercise Clause.19 However some, including then Justice Souter, have
questioned the viability of this exception, arguing it is at most an acknowledgement that Smith
did not weaken the protections provided by other constitutional provisions.20
The second exception is likely more significant. In the case of laws under which the
government has a system of exemptions, the Court concluded that—at a minimum—the
government may not refuse to extend an exemption in a “religious hardship” situation without a
compelling reason.21 This exception may have broad application because often laws include
secular exemptions or grant government agencies authority to create either categorical or
individualized waivers, exemptions, or variances to otherwise applicable rules.22 For example, in
a decision authored by now Justice Alito, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the existence of a categorical medical exemption to a police department’s no-beard policy
required that the department’s refusal to provide a religious exemption be subject to heightened
scrutiny even post-Smith.23 Similarly, a federal district court recently concluded that the
numerous categorical and individualized exemptions to a law requiring pharmacists to dispense
emergency contraceptives rendered the law not generally applicable and so not covered by
Smith.24 The extent of this exception, however, is not completely clear. For example, in the nobeard policy case the court also concluded that the exemption for undercover police officers, by
itself, would not have rendered the policy subject to heightened scrutiny. 25 Similarly, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the mere existence of some secular
exemptions to a land use regulation was not enough to render the regulation not generally
applicable absent evidence of subjective application of such exemptions or religious animus.26
There is also an additional complication in the form of post-Smith legislative
developments. In 1993, the federal government adopted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

18

United States v. Mubayyid, 476 F. Supp. 2d 46, 58–60 (D. Mass. 2007).
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
20
See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 566–67 (Souter, J., concurring); Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck:
The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 630–32
(2003) (summarizing the criticisms of the hybrid claim exception).
21
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise and Individualized Exemptions: Herein
of Smith, Sherbert, Hogwarts, and Religious Liberty, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1178 (2005) (discussing the continuing
vitality of Sherbert with regard to hardship exemptions from a generally applicable law in the aftermath of Smith).
22
See Duncan, supra note 21, at 1190–98 (reaching this conclusion and discussing cases applying the exception).
23
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365–66 (3d Cir. 1999).
24
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 854 F. Supp. 2d 925, 978 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
25
Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366.
26
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 655 (10th Cir. 2006); see also id. at 651
(collecting cases reaching a similar conclusion); see also Mitchell County v. Zimmerman, 801 N.W.2d 1, 12-15
(Iowa 2012) (collecting cases discussing this issue).
19
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(RFRA), seeking to restore the pre-Smith protections for religiously motivated actions.27 While
the Supreme Court subsequently held that the federal RFRA cannot apply as against state
governments,28 many states adopted similar legislation.29 Furthermore, some state courts have
concluded that their state constitutions continue to provide the level of protection for religious
exercise that existed under the federal Constitution pre-Smith, and other state courts have found a
level of state constitutional protection somewhere between the pre-Smith and post-Smith federal
constitutional levels of protection.30 The effect of state RFRAs and such state constitutional
holdings is limited, however, by the fact that courts have generally looked to the pre-Smith case
law to determine the reach of these laws and, as noted previously, that case law was less
protective of such actions than might be thought.31
The federal government also adopted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) 32 in 2000, in response to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that RFRA
could only apply to the federal government.33 With respect to state regulation of religious
organizations, RLUIPA limits the ability of state and local governments to deny religiously
related use of real property based on otherwise neutral and generally applicable zoning laws by
re-imposing the pre-Smith strict scrutiny test on such decisions and also prohibiting
discrimination against or exclusion of religious organizations by requiring that religious land
uses be treated on “equal terms” with nonreligious land uses.34 At least one commentator argues,
however, that based on the court RLUIPA decisions to date the primary effect of the statute
appears to have been to bring greater judicial scrutiny to decisions involving religious land use,
as courts generally overturn such decisions only if that scrutiny reveals discriminatory or
otherwise unfair government action.35
B. The Ministerial Exception and the Hosanna-Tabor Decision
Two important lines of cases that the Supreme Court did not fully address in Smith relate
to limits on government entanglement with the internal affairs of religious organizations.36 The
Court briefly mentioned the first line of such cases, which involved decisions imposing such
limits in the context of intra-church or intra-denominational disputes that involved significant
ecclesiastical matters.37 The other line of cases involved federal appellate court decisions (and
27

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006); see also Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 211
(2004) (listing other federal legislative responses to Smith).
28
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
29
See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 477 &
n.67 (2010) (listing the sixteen state RFRA statutes).
30
See Laycock, supra note 27, at 211-12 (summarizing the various state legislative and judicial responses to Smith);
Piero A. Tozzi, Whither Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and the Rebirth of State Constitutional Free
Exercise Jurisprudence?, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 269, 276-83 (2009) (discussing the mixed—and to some extent
muddled—interpretation by state courts of state constitutional provisions protecting free exercise of religion).
31
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
32
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
33
Alan C. Weinstein, The Effect of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions on Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1221, 1223 & n.13 (2012).
34
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1).
35
See Weinstein, supra note 33, at 1234, 1242.
36
See generally PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 184-87 (discussing these two lines of cases).
37
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on
Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 390–97 (1984) (discussing
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similar state court decisions) imposing such limits in the context of employment disputes with
ministers and other employees who perform religious functions by creating a so-called
“ministerial exception” to various employment laws.38 While not squarely addressed by the
Supreme Court prior to 2012, the ministerial exception arguably has its origin in the first line of
cases and particularly a case where the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a state
law that sought to resolve a dispute over who had the authority to choose the ruling prelate of the
Russian Orthodox Church in America.39 These lines of cases together arguably demonstrated
that the First Amendment creates a zone of independence or autonomy for religious
organizations within which governments cannot interfere, albeit a zone with unclear borders.40
After its 1990 decision in Smith, the Supreme Court did not take up a dispute squarely
implicating either of these lines of cases until 2011, where for the first time it agreed to consider
the viability of the “ministerial exception” decision.41 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC,42 the Court unanimously concluded that the lower courts had
correctly found that such an exception existed under the First Amendment.43 More specifically,
it decided that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of
a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”44 In the course of reaching this conclusion, the
Court cited favorably to the other line of cases involving intra-church or intra-denominational
disputes, further indicating that this line also remained viable.45 The Court also distinguished
this context from that of Smith on the following grounds:
Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present
case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. . . . The contention
that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion
Clauses has no merit.46
This argument highlights the Court’s view that Smith does not reach “internal church
decision[s] that affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself,” effectively creating a zone of

this line of cases); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 845–48 (2009) (same).
38
See generally Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21-22 & nn. 92–97
(2011) (listing federal appellate and state court decisions recognizing the ministerial exception).
39
See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952) (concluding the New York law was
unconstitutional because it “directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church’s choice of
its hierarchy”).
40
See generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1633 (discussing how Smith should affect the choice between the three approaches the Supreme
Court has taken in cases involving the internal governance of religious organizations); Douglas Laycock, A Survey
of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 433–37 (1986) (examining the differing levels of
church autonomy accorded in various contexts).
41
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (order granting
petition for writ of certiorari).
42
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
43
See id. at 706. See generally Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and
the Constitutional Structure, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2011–2012, at 307 (2012).
44
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
45
Id. at 704–05.
46
Id. at 707 (citation omitted).
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activity outside of the reach of Smith and of government more generally.47 Hosanna-Tabor did
not clearly resolve, however, the exact parameters of this zone, either with respect to the
ministerial exception specifically or more broadly with respect to the internal governance of
churches and possibly religious organizations in general.
Turning first to the ministerial exception, the Court only partially answered one critical
question and left relatively unclear a second critical question. The first question is who, exactly,
qualifies as a “minister” for purposes of this exception. Addressing this issue in Hosanna-Tabor,
the Court looked to “all the circumstances of [plaintiff’s] employment.”48 More specifically, the
Court considered whether the employing organization held her out as a minister, whether she had
received religious training, whether she had been formally commissioned as a minister, whether
she held herself out as a minister, and whether her job duties “reflected a role in conveying the
Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”49 The Court did not consider controlling the
fact that most of the plaintiff’s duties were secular in nature, rejecting the determinative weight
given by the Sixth Circuit to the relatively small amount of time spent by the plaintiff on
religious functions.50 This totality of the circumstances approach naturally leaves significant
ambiguity, in particular with regard to how much weight to give to each factor. The Court was
also not unanimous on this issue, as Justice Thomas would have instead “defer[red] to a religious
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister,”51 and Justice Alito
(joined by Justice Kagan) would have “focus[ed] on the function performed by persons who
work for religious bodies” instead of formal commissioning, which does not occur in some
faiths.52 Nevertheless, the Court did provide some guidance on this key question even if it did
not provide a bright line rule.
The other key question the Court only answered implicitly, however, leaving much more
room for uncertainty: to wit, what types of organizations can have ministers? As one
commentator has already noted, the Court in its decision appeared to use the terms “church,”
“religious group,” “religious organization,” and “religious institution” interchangeably and
without definition or explanation.53 The Court clearly felt that the covered organizations for
purposes of the ministerial exception were not limited to a purely worship-focused church, as the
organization in Hosanna-Tabor was both a church and school.54 But the Court did not explain
what factors were determinative or even relevant for its apparent conclusion that such an
institution could have ministers for whom its employment decisions would be covered by the
ministerial exception. Furthermore, Justice Thomas in concurrence appears to have carefully
avoided using the term “church” in favor of the term “religious organization,”55 and Justice
Alito, also in concurrence, likewise appears to have favored terms such as “religious bodies,”
“religious groups,” and “religious organizations,”56 indicating a view that the exception extends
beyond traditional churches.
47

Id.
Id. at 707.
49
Id. at 707–08.
50
Id. at 709.
51
Id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring).
52
Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).
53
Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 503 (2013).
54
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699.
55
See id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
56
See Murray, supra note 53, at 503-04 (discussing Justice Alito’s opinion).
48
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Turning now to the other line of cases, it also raises but does not fully answer two similar
questions. The first question is what decisions qualify as internal decisions involving significant
ecclesiastical matters that are therefore protected from government regulation. A review of the
federal cases in this line by Professor Carl Esbeck revealed a relatively small but important set of
decisions regarding:
(1) questions about correct doctrine and resolving doctrinal disputes; (2) the
choice of ecclesiastical polity, including the proper application of procedures set
forth in organic documents, bylaws, and canons; (3) the selection, credentials,
promotion, discipline, and retention of clerics and other ministers; (4) the
admission, discipline, and expulsion of organizational members; (5) disputes over
the direction of the ministry, including the allocation of resources; and, (6)
communication to the organization’s clerics or the laity about matters of
governance.57
Professor Esbeck further noted that the this set is likely relatively small (and presumably
likely to remain small) because once a decision falls into this area, the courts no longer balance
governmental interests against the burden on religiously motivated activities but instead
categorically forbid government interference.58
Nevertheless, some courts have extended such protection to broad government
investigations that seemed likely to lead to regulatory actions that could threaten the religious
duties and objectives of a religious organization. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found an investigation into the finances and costs of private schools to be
unconstitutional as applied to Catholic parochial schools because of the likely impact of the
admittedly very broad inquiry on the religious mission of those schools.59 Similarly, a federal
district court concluded that a broad Attorney General investigation of a church’s finances and
activities based on a media report of alleged illegal activities was unconstitutional, although a
narrower investigation pursuant to clear statutory authority was permissible.60 Some courts have
also refused to resolve tort claims that require deciding issues of religious doctrine. For
example, the Supreme Court of Texas dismissed a lawsuit bringing various claims relating to
church ministers and members’ actions involving the forcible laying on of hands on another
member of the church.61 The court determined that resolving the lawsuit would unavoidably
involve deciding issues of religious doctrine, which it concluded the Free Exercise Clause
prohibited.62 While this case may be an outlier, it demonstrates that courts are sometimes wary
of deciding even otherwise common types of legal cases involving religious organizations if
religious doctrine is a central issue.
The second question is what types of organizations are eligible to make these types of
protected decisions. While most of the cases in this line involve entities that are easily classified
as churches or denominations, a few involve other types of religious organizations such as
57

Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self Governance: Hosanna-Tabor and the
First Amendment, 13 ENGAGE 168, 169 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
58
Id.
59
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
60
Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. Morales, 787 F. Supp. 689, 702, 705-06 (W.D. Tex. 1992), rev’d on
other grounds, 986 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1993).
61
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tex. 2008).
62
Id. at 12–13.
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parochial schools63 and religious communities.64 None of the decisions explain, however, how
far the group of organizations that will receive this deference to their decision making extends,
although for entities other than churches and denominations a close affiliation with a church or
denomination appears to be required.65 Therefore, as is the case with the ministerial exception,
the type of decision that is protected from government interference is at least somewhat clear but
the type of organization that can make such a decision is far less clear.66 The ramifications of
this situation will be discussed further in Part II.
C. Establishment and the Winn Decision
It is natural to focus primarily on what legal limits exist regarding state government
attempts to restrict or regulate religious organizations. The flip side of this issue, however, is to
query what legal limits exist regarding state government attempts to exempt religious
organizations from otherwise applicable rules or to otherwise provide special treatment to
religious organizations.67 It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore this other group of
limitations, but there is one area that has seen recent developments and so is worth highlighting:
the extent to which private parties can challenge such exemptions or special treatment in court.
There is, of course, a long history of governments providing such exemptions and
special treatment, ranging from the numerous tax exemptions and other special tax provisions
enjoyed by religious organizations (often along with other types of nonprofit entities) to the
many exemptions from other types of laws for churches or religious organizations, such as
charitable solicitation registration and reporting requirements.68
At the same time,
Establishment Clause challenges by members of the public to these benefits and other special
treatment are also now a regular fixture of the legal landscape.69 A member of the public who is
only able to asset a generalized grievance resulting from the government’s provision of a benefit
or exemption to another person issue lacks standing to challenge the government’s decision
under the “taxpayer standing” line of cases,70 but there is an exception for challenges based on

63

See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
See, e.g., Wipf v. Hutterville Hutterian Bretheren, Inc., 808 N.W.2d 678 (S.D. 2012).
65
See, e.g., Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118–21 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting a requirement that
an organization be “completely religious” in order to be protected from government regulation under the Religion
Clauses, but suggesting that a “substantial religious character” and a close relationship with religious authorities is
required), aff’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
66
See Hurst, supra note 7, at 97-98 (arguing that the Supreme Court is moving toward a narrower definition of the
religious sphere and therefore toward a narrower view of what organizations qualify as religious organizations under
the First Amendment).
67
See generally Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of
the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006).
68
See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1407, 1445–50 (1992) (discussing the large number and breadth of exemptions and other special treatment
provided by state and federal statutes for religious organizations); Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation
As Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
69
See Mark C. Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the Establishment Clause, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
835, 844 (2012) (describing such litigation).
70
See generally Kristen Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway? Considering the Standing Question in
DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 54-56 (2006).
64
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the Establishment Clause.71 The scope of that exception was at issue in the recent case Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.72
Winn involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a state tuition tax credit that, in
part, benefitted sectarian schools.73 Before the Supreme Court could reach the merits of the
case, however, it had to consider whether the taxpayers bringing the claim had standing to do
so. The Court first concluded that the reason for generally denying taxpayers standing to
challenge government expenditures or tax benefits—the speculative nature of any prediction
that the government action would result in particular financial or other injury to the plaintiffs—
applied in this situation, so the plaintiffs in Winn could not have standing unless an exception to
the general rule applied.74 The Court then reaffirmed an earlier decision, which it characterized
as having recognized such an exception “when, in violation of the Establishment Clause and by
means of the taxing and spending power, [the taxpayers’] property is transferred through the
Government’s Treasury to a sectarian entity.”75
What is noteworthy about Winn is that the Court then went on to conclude that tax
credits (and presumably, by extension, all tax provisions that favor taxpayers, including
exemptions and deductions) are not equivalent to legislatively directed government
expenditures because they represent a legislative decision not impose a tax on a party other than
the challenging taxpayer and so no connection exists between the taxation of the plaintiffs in the
case and the provision of the credit.76 The Court therefore distinguished this situation from one
where the legislature dictates that a certain expenditure must be made out of the government’s
general funds (which would include the taxes collected from plaintiffs challenging the
expenditure) favoring one or more religious organizations.77 In those situations, taxpayers
generally appear to have standing to challenge spending by the legislature if the challenge is
based on Establishment Clause grounds.78 An example of a transfer which gives such standing
comes from my home town of South Bend, Indiana, where taxpayers successfully brought suit
challenging the local government’s decision to purchase a piece of property and then transfer
it—on what the court found to be favorable terms—to a Catholic school.79 While the defendant
city did not raise the issue, the federal district court hearing the case still considered whether the
plaintiffs challenging the transfer on Establishment Clause grounds had standing to do so and
concluded they did because the plaintiffs were municipal taxpayers and the city had used tax
dollars to acquire the property at issue.80
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The Supreme Court’s holding in Winn significantly limits the ability of taxpayers to
challenge exemptions or other special treatment provided to religious organizations on
Establishment Clause grounds in the federal courts, at least when the vehicle for doing so is the
tax laws. The effect of the Winn decision on Establishment Clause litigation generally,
however, is not clear yet. For example, in an unreported opinion a federal district court held
that if a plaintiff alleges unequal treatment because of the denial of a tax benefit that is available
to similarly situated religious organizations or individuals, that plaintiff has standing to pursue
the claim as that allegation is a well pled injury in fact for the plaintiff and so the taxpayer
standing cases do not apply.81 That opinion therefore holds that if a plaintiff can establish they
would receive the benefit but for their lack of religious status, then the plaintiff has alleged a
sufficient, non-speculative specific injury in fact to provide standing. If the holding of this case
survives and is accepted by other federal courts—a result that is far from certain—it would
mean that tax benefits provided by governments specifically to religious organizations but not
to similarly situated secular entities could still lead to lengthy challenges, although such
challenges may not ultimately be successful.82 Furthermore, the Winn decision did not
foreclose state courts, as opposed to federal courts, from considering federal Establishment
Clause challenges under the generally more liberal taxpayer standing rules in state courts.83
Finally, municipal taxpayers generally have standing to challenge spending decisions by their
municipality, in contrast to federal and state taxpayers who generally lack standing to challenge
spending decisions by the federal government or their state government, and so would have
standing to challenge those decisions on Establishment Clause as well as other grounds.84
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II. THE FUTURE OF LIMITS ON STATE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
As the above discussion details, the exact parameters of the limits on state regulation of
religious organizations are not fully settled. Any predications of how those parameters will be
resolved or will shift in the future are therefore difficult to make. Nevertheless, I will attempt to
make a few such predications here based on the current trends, as well as highlighting some
issues that are too difficult to predict at this point.
A. Broadly Permitted Regulation
Smith currently controls the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
and there is little reason to think that the Court is likely to revisit this now more than 20-year old
precedent. While only two of the justices who participated in that decision remain on the Court
(Justices Scalia and Kennedy), they both voted in the majority, and Justice Scalia authored the
Court’s opinion. More importantly, only one of the current justices has indicated in a subsequent
Supreme Court opinion any disagreement with its holding.85 While Justice Alito showed some
sympathy for free exercise claims in opinions he authored while on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit,86 it is far from clear that he would go so far as to support overruling Smith.
The rule of Smith, that valid and neutral laws of general applicability may, constitutionally, apply
with equal force to both religious organizations and nonreligious organizations, therefore appears
unlikely to change for at least the near future.
Of course, some state constitutions and laws provide greater protection.87 Even then,
however, those provisions at most invoke the pre-Smith level of protection, which, as mentioned
previously, was generally less strong than it appeared on its face.88 Furthermore, the evidence to
date is that litigation invoking the protection of state RFRA laws and state constitutional
provisions is relatively rare and even more rarely successful, in part because state courts have
often interpreted state RFRAs and state constitutions as providing less protection than existed
under the pre-Smith cases.89 So while the exact limits provided under state law will vary from
state to state, even the highest level of protection may not deter much state regulation of religious
organizations. This is particularly true with respect to enforcement of tax-law based restrictions
on such organizations, as the Supreme Court showed particular deference to tax-based
restrictions pre-Smith.90
Other than the internal governance exception and related ministerial exception that I will
discuss in a moment, the remaining legal limits on state government regulation of religious
organizations are therefore the constitutional prohibition on disfavoring a particular religion and,
arguably, the Smith rule exception for laws that include a system of exemptions. With respect to
85
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disfavoring a particular religion, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye case illustrates that a state
law or regulation clearly targeting the practices of a particular faith will be unconstitutional.91
Similarly if a government agency chooses to selectively apply an otherwise neutral and generally
applicable law or regulation only to disfavored religious organizations, that selective application
would be similarly unconstitutional if it could be proved.92 With respect to exemptions, there is
at least some case law indicating that if a government agency has the authority to grant
discretionary exemptions it generally must do so when not doing so will result in a substantial
burden on religiously motivated activity.93 To exact extent of this exception is still unclear,
however. Absent religious discrimination or a system of exemptions, and outside the relatively
narrow context covered by RLUIPA, the combination of the Smith decision and the apparently
relatively weak free exercise protection that exists—even in jurisdictions where state
constitutions or laws appear on their face to grant more such protection—therefore indicates that
state governments likely will continue to have a comparatively free hand in applying neutral and
generally applicable laws to churches and other religious organizations.
B. Limited if Uncertain Scope of the Ministerial and Internal Governance
Exceptions
Even pre-Smith, the First Amendment protection for religiously motivated actions was a
balancing test that looked at both the burden on religious belief and the interest of the
government furthered by the regulation at issue. In contrast, both the federal appellate courts and
now the Supreme Court have held that, if the ministerial exception applies, no such balancing
test is applicable; instead, the protected decision is simply off-limits to otherwise applicable
government regulation, such as anti-discrimination laws.94 Internal governance decisions of
churches and at least some other religious organizations that involve significant ecclesiastical
matters are similarly off-limits, with courts required to stand aside from resolving disputes
regarding such decisions.95 Furthermore, it can be reasonably argued that other government
agencies and officials must likewise avoid involvement in such disputes, although the courts
generally have not reached this issue. So even if a state regulator decided it was prudent to
become involved in such disputes,96 they likely would face constitutional barriers to doing so.
Because a decision that falls within either the internal governance exception or the related
ministerial exception effectively removes that decision from government oversight, the courts
have tended to narrowly construe these exceptions in several ways and likely will continue to do
so.97 One way is to carefully limit the types of decisions that fall within these exceptions. For
example, with respect to the ministerial exception the courts have only applied it as against
employment-related claims, such as allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or
sexual orientation when making hiring, firing, promotion, and similar employment decisions, as
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well as wrongful termination claims.98 The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor was in fact
careful to limit the holding of that case to employment discrimination suits such as the one at
issue there, “express[ing] no view on whether the [ministerial] exception bars other types of suits
. . . .”99 In the more general internal dispute arena courts have allowed states to refuse to apply
the exception when the dispute turns primarily on state law matters and resolution of nonreligious factual matters as opposed to ecclesiastical matters, and so can be resolved by reference
to religiously neutral principles.100 Courts have also generally refused to extend these exceptions
to protect a minister from torts claims relating to the minister’s conduct or the minister’s
employer from negligent hiring or negligent supervision torts claims.101
Another way to narrowly construe the exceptions would be to limit the organizations
deemed capable of making these types of decisions generally and with respect to selection of
ministers specifically. Current case law clearly does not limit covered organizations to
traditional churches or similar bodies of non-Christian faiths, with religious schools being the
most common example of a covered non-church, religious organization.102 That said, even in the
school context courts have generally required both a relatively strong and pervasive religious
character for the organization and a formal tie to a church or denominational body. 103 Again
because of the strength of protection that exists if these exceptions apply, it seems likely that
courts will continue to be reluctant to extend them to organizations that are not clearly sectarian
in nature. That said, the federal courts are currently split over whether Free Exercise Clause
protection extends to for-profit entities in the context of challenges to a mandate from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to provide health insurance coverage for
contraception.104
Finally, in the ministerial exception context another means of limiting the reach of that
exception is to narrowly define the term minister. As with covered organizations, the courts
have not, however, sharply limited this term by, for example, only applying it to individuals who
are formally identified as ministers and engage full-time in the administration of sacrament or

98

See Lund, supra note 38, at 21–22.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012).
100
See, e.g., Askew v. Trs. of Gen. Assembly of Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684
F.3d 413, 419 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When a church dispute turns on a question devoid of doctrinal implications, civil
courts may employ neutral principles of law to adjudicate the controversy.” (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,
602–03 (1979)).
101
See, e.g., Sanders v. Baucum, 929 F. Supp. 1028, 1033–36 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (collecting cases); see also People v.
Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 316–17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (concluding that state compelled disclosure of documents
relating to an alleged sexual assault was not unconstitutional); Soc’y of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth,
808 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2004) (same); Laycock, supra note 95, at 274.
102
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
103
See, e.g., Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011-CA-000004-MR, 2012 WL 3046472, at *5–6 (Ky.
Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (holding that seminary qualified for the ministerial exception because of its faith-based
purpose, the fact students attended in order to be prepared for Christian ministry, and its relationship with the
Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)).
104
Compare, e.g., Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (concluding
that Free Exercise Clause protection extends at least to a closely held secular, for-profit enterprise when the owners
operate the enterprise in accordance with their religious beliefs) with, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (W.D. Ok. 2012) (concluding for-profit corporations do not have constitutional free
exercise rights). See generally Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Money-Makers?
(2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2229632.
99

14

rites.105 Rather, the courts, and most recently the Supreme Court, have favored a totality of the
facts and circumstances approach that considers formal ordination, public identification, selfidentification, and duties, but does not make any particular fact controlling.106 Nevertheless, the
courts may look with skepticism on claims of minister status for individuals who were not
clearly identified as ministers both by their employer and by themselves. Attempts to argue that
employees beyond those who are consistently held out as ministers are ministers may therefore
fail, as almost certainly may attempts to argue that employees whose duties are purely secular in
nature are ministers merely because they work for a religious organization.107
A recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision indicates, however, that courts may be willing to
define “minister” more broadly for these purposes. Considering how to determine if an
individual is a minster post-Hosanna-Tabor, the court rejected its previously adopted three-prong
test in favor of a broad facts and circumstances test.108 It then concluded that a “Music Director”
for a Catholic church was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception because music
played an important role in the celebration of Mass, the Music Director selected the hymns to be
played and trained cantors, and the church considered him a minister as a result, even though the
Music Director was not ordained, had not received ministerial training, and did not apparently
explicitly hold himself out as a minister.109
The bottom line is therefore that while the internal governance and ministerial exceptions
remain viable even in the wake of Smith, courts are most likely to continue to construe them
relatively narrowly. That said, the exact scope of who is a minister and what is a religious
organization that can invoke these protections remains uncertain. State governments seeking to
apply their neutral and generally applicable laws should therefore be careful when doing so may
interfere with decisions by arguably religious organizations that involve ministerial employment
or internal governance decisions. Similarly, state officials should be wary of becoming involved
in helping to resolve internal disputes if the dispute is of the type that may fall within one of
these exceptions.
C. The Wild Card of Establishment Clause Challenges
In our increasingly secular society110 it is not surprising that there have been many
challenges to the enactment of laws and others actions by governments that appear to favor
religious organizations either through exemptions from other applicable laws or through other
special treatment.111 Some have even proposed that any special treatment of religion, religious
organizations, or religious individuals is no longer justified.112 The first hurdle that a challenger
to such actions has to overcome is establishing standing in court. The Supreme Court’s decision
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in Winn makes doing so more difficult in some circumstances, but how much more difficult
remains unclear.
Turning first to exemptions and other special treatment provided through the tax laws,
Winn appears at first glance to make challenges to such provisions very difficult because of its
holding that the Establishment Clause exception to the general rule that taxpayers lack standing
to challenge government spending and taxing decisions does not apply to credits—and
presumably therefore exemptions and deductions—provided through the tax laws, as such items
do not represent government expenditures.113 The recent federal district court decision relating
to the pastoral housing exclusion from gross income indicates, however, that parties seeking to
challenge such provisions may be able to instead establish standing if they can show they are
similarly situated to those who benefit from these provisions but are denied such benefits only
because they lack a religious character.114 Furthermore, even if the federal courts are closed to
plaintiffs challenging such provisions the states courts may not be.115 The barrier created by
Winn to challenging these tax provisions may therefore not be insurmountable.
As for other types of exemptions and special treatment, Winn does not address the nontax context and so the previous case law that found standing for taxpayers to challenge such
provisions if their claim is brought under the Establishment Clause still appears to apply. Of
course, that exception still requires an exercise of the legislature’s taxing and spending power to
be at issue, which is not always the case, particularly with respect to exemptions from otherwise
applicable laws.116 Absent the exercise of such power, plaintiffs seeking to challenge such
provisions must find a more particularized basis for their standing than their status as taxpayers,
as the plaintiffs in the challenge to the pastoral housing exclusion arguably did.
It is not clear if the Supreme Court or other courts will further alter the standing law in
this area. Assuming they do not, it remains possible—if not always easy—for plaintiffs to
having standing to challenge exemptions and other special treatment provided to religious
organizations, particularly if similarly situated nonreligious organizations are not eligible for
such provisions or a legislature actually authorizes expenditures that intentionally favor one or
more religious organizations over other organizations (as opposed to tax benefits or exemptions
that are deemed to not result in such expenditures under Winn). State and local governments
should therefore be aware that such challenges are not only possible but may proceed past the
motion to dismiss stage if the plaintiffs can establish their standing to bring such challenges on
one of these grounds, leading to significant litigation costs even if the plaintiffs are not
ultimately successful.
CONCLUSION
Existing case law bars state laws, courts, and probably officials from becoming involved
in a relatively narrow but important set of decisions by religious organizations that relate to the
application of their religious views to internal governance and choice of leadership. In this area
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the courts have held the First Amendment requires governments to stand aside, and, as the
Supreme Court’s recent unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor strongly indicates, that is likely
to remain their position for the foreseeable future. At the same time, the courts are also likely to
continue to limit this high level of protection to a relatively small group of decisions involving
the application of religious beliefs by churches and other clearly religious organizations.
Outside of this protected area, the Smith decision holds that state governments are
generally free to adopt and apply neutral laws of general applicability even if those laws
substantially burden the religiously motivated actions of religious organizations unless those
governments provide for secular but not religious exemptions from such laws. While some
states provide greater protection for such actions through state constitutional provisions or
statutes and the federal government provides greater protection through RLUIPA to certain real
property related actions, courts applying these additional protections still tend to permit such
government regulation and it seems unlikely that they will significantly change this approach.
That said, if a government regulation is either adopted or implemented in a way that has the
purpose and effect of discriminating on the basis of religious beliefs against religious
organizations generally or a particular religious group specifically, such regulation is still likely
to fail in the face of a federal constitutional challenge. (This conclusion does not, however,
usually extend to conditions placed on government grants or other government benefits that are
not generally available.117) Furthermore, if a particular regulatory regime has a system of
secular exemptions the government may be required to demonstrate why religious exemptions
should not also be granted.
Finally, courts have also shown an increasing willingness to avoid resolving
Establishment Clause challenges to exemptions and other special treatment for religious
organizations absent either a particularized injury to the complaining party or a clear
expenditure of government funds. In Winn the Supreme Court may have foreclosed most such
challenges to tax provisions that favor religious organizations by applying the lack of taxpayer
standing general rule, although the exact ramifications of that decision—particularly in the state
courts—remain to be seen. Nevertheless, state governments must continue to be aware that
special treatment of religious organizations, particularly through expenditures, is still vulnerable
to challenges that could involve lengthy litigation and possibly defeat.
The limits on state regulation of religious organizations are a dynamic legal area, but in
many ways both the current and likely future borders for such regulation are at least somewhat
apparent. Those borders combine a constitutionally required respect for the internal, religiously
based decision making of such organizations with the conclusion that outside such decisions
religious organizations can be made subject to the same rules that apply to secular entities.
What remains perhaps most unclear is the extent to which members of the public can challenge
choices by state legislators and other officials to exempt religious organizations from such rules
or otherwise to treat such organizations specially, and so such challenges will remain a
continuing issue for state governments.
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